As demonstrated by this report, the pervasive deployment of FRT systems by police has a negative impact on the lives and fundamental rights of those under the surveillance of these technologies. The risks and harms are significant while, in the absence of legal frameworks providing for accountability and transparency, the seeking or obtaining of redress for those harms is very difficult. Worse, in cases where people are utterly unaware that FRT is being used against them, any such access to redress is near impossible.

In the face of the ever-expanding use of FRT by police forces across the world, the aim of this report and the principles is to both help reduce those harms and empower civil society and the general population with a clear understanding of these technologies. We hope they can use this information to voice their opposition to the deployment of FRT in their respective states.

To achieve these goals, we believe the principles can be used in the following four ways:

  1. This document can be used as an advocacy tool when debating and discussing FRT with law and policy makers. Our principles encompass the entire spectrum of deploying an FRT system, from establishing the legal foundation that permits its use to the practical implementation of FRT by law enforcement. Principles such as 1, 2, 6 and 12 address critical high-level safeguards that should be embedded in any legislation regulating FRT. These bare minimum legal provisions are built on the principles of transparency, public participation and access to remedy that are part of the basic consensus of democratic regimes. The principles also provide detailed requirements beyond basic regulations, covering development guidelines and public policies. For example, Principle 4 details what an assessment which aims to reduce vendor lock-in should include. Another example is Principle 13, which details the information that should be disclosed to persons detained or prosecuted subsequent to a use of FRT.
  2. Beyond law and policy making, we hope this document serves as a tool when engaging with police forces as they define their protocols and procedures for FRT use. A key concern is the interaction between an FRT system, its users within a police force and the effects on an investigation or prosecution, which leads to potential harm. For this reason, we have included principles, such as Principle 11, that detail the documentation that should be produced when using these systems, as records of use to facilitate accountability.
  1. The principles are rooted in international human rights standards and judgments, reflecting the idea that they naturally safeguard the fundamental rights essential to democracies. For that reason, we think these principles may be of use before courts when building cases against the harms produced by FRT systems. These principles serve as a tool to challenge the use of FRT when laws either include provisions that violate fundamental rights or lack specific regulations for FRT deployment.
  1. Finally, we accompany the principles with a review and explanation of the harms, risks and fundamental rights impacted by the deployment of FRT by police. We list, in detail, the kinds of questions that must be asked of authorities intent on using FRT. We hope that this information will help ensure that any advocacy or campaign initiative is grounded in a clear understanding of the issues. We hope this will empower civil society to voice their concerns in an accessible manner to members of the public who, together with civil society, can build and develop campaigns against the use of FRT.

These are some of the uses we hope this report and principles will serve. The matters covered by these principles are not the only considerations that could be taken when debating the use of FRT systems; indeed, as the systems become more sophisticated, new considerations will emerge. However, we hope that, after reading this document, readers are better informed of the risks associated with FRT and more convinced that, when used by police forces, there is scant evidence that FRT improves our lives and, on the contrary, much to indicate a high likelihood of harm.

Closing words

The authors of and contributors to this guidebook believe that the best use of FRT is that it not be used by police at all. As exhaustively explained throughout this guidebook, the risks and potential harms associated with using FRT systems outweigh any possible benefits. The substantial costs – to both individual privacy and societal trust – make its deployment in the policing context unjustifiable.

Acknowledgements

These principles were designed following INCLO’s 2023 yearly meeting when the widespread lack of technical and legal expertise regarding police use of FRT was identified as a pressing concern across all member jurisdictions. Human rights specialists from the fields of law, technology, sociology, and communication across the 15 INCLO countries came together throughout 2023 and 2024 to develop this list of principles.

This project was developed, drafted and edited by Olga Cronin (INCLO/ICCL), Víctor Práxedes Saavedra Rionda (INCLO), Elizabeth Farries (University College Dublin Centre for Digital Policy), Kirill Koroteev (Agora), and Timilehin Ojo (INCLO/CCLA).

This is a collaborative effort by 15 INCLO member organizations. For their contributions towards the development, case study, drafting, editing and research, INCLO sincerely thanks: Lucila Santos (INCLO), Vanessa Lopez (Dejusticia), Sherylle Dass (LRC), Devon Turner (LRC), Manuel Tufró (CELS), Ben Wizner (ACLU), Kieran Pender (HRLC), David Mejia-Canales (HRLC), Martin Mavenjina (KHRC), Gil Gan-Mor (ACRI), Anaïs Bussières McNicoll (CCLA), Karim Medhat Ennarah (EIPR), Sehba Meenai (HRLN), Remport Ádám (TASZ), Nadine Sherani (KontraS), Emmanuelle Andrews (Liberty), Nathan Freed Wessler (ACLU), Jun Pang (Liberty), Daniel Konikoff (CCLA) and Daniel Ospina Celis (Dejusticia).

INCLO credits Designed For Good’s Taryn McKay for design, Sam Kelly for edits and Alina Najlis for illustrations.